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Abstract
We propose a flexible decision support scheme which could be used in managing the wage negotiation between employers
and employees. This scheme uses fuzzy inference systems and game theory concepts in arriving at decisions on future
wage increase which could be more mutually agreeable. For example, rather than specifying 5% yearly increase of wages,
we propose that the uncertain factors which are mostly difficult to predict and that could affect wage decisions need to
be taken into consideration by the wage formula. These include business revenues or (profit), inflation rate, number of
competitors, cost of production, and other uncertain factors that may affect business operations. The accuracy of the
fuzzy rule base and the game strategies will help to mitigate the adverse effects that a business may suffer from these
uncertain factors. Based on our scheme, we propose that employers and employees should calculate their future wage by
using a fuzzy rule base and strategies that take into consideration these uncertain variables. The proposed approach is
illustrated with a case study and the procedure and methodology may be easily implemented by business organisations
in their wage bargaining and decision processes.
Keywords: fuzzy logic, membership, functions, decision, wage negotiation, business games, game theory, zero sum.
1. Introduction
Wage negotiation has always caused persistent prob-
lems in business organisations [1, 2]. On many occasions,
there have been cases in which the entire workforce of
countries embarked on industrial strikes that resulted from
wage negotiation problems. Gielen and VanOurs in [1] in-
vestigated what determines quits and layoffs that usually
result as problems of poor wage negotiations by using a
unique matched worker-firm dataset from the Netherlands.
They concluded that in wage negotiation, the wage growth
of a worker that stays in the firm is larger if that worker
had a high quit probability and smaller when that worker
had a high layoff probability.
In most cases, annual escalation clauses in employment
contracts do specify future percentage increases in wages
which are not tied to any index or rules. However, very
often employers do find it difficult to meet these rigid [3,
4, 5] percentages and therefore, on various occasions, these
have resulted into industrial disputes between employers
and employees (or their unions) [6, 7, 5]. The percentages
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are mostly based on predictions of future inflation which
are often misleading and based on historical data.
Many authors have agreed that wages ought to be pos-
itively linked to financial performance of the business and
some also have detected some links between wages and
profits [4].
In this paper however, rather than pre-setting a rigid
future and yearly percentage increase in wages, we pro-
pose a flexible scheme for employers and employees which
they can use as a decision support system for their future
salary increase. This scheme uses a fuzzy inference system
in arriving at more mutually agreeable decisions on wage
increase.
The root causes of wage negotiation [8, 1] disputes,
in most cases, are often connected to the inability of ei-
ther of the two parties involved (employers and employees’
unions) to sustain or maintain the status quo contained in
their earlier agreement on wage increase [5]. This may be
as a result of many uncertain factors that surround busi-
ness environment such as inflation and change in profit of
the business.
1.1. Decision Making Processes in a Firm
A decision is a goal-directed behaviour made by the
individual, in response to a certain need, with the intention
Preprint submitted to Elsevier December 9, 2011
of satisfying the motive that the need occasions [9]. The
decision process begins with identification of a problem
and ends with a choice. The problem arises when a sought-
after goal can be obtained via alternative and sometimes
competing avenues.
Decision makers in an organisation are expected to be
aware of and to be able to assess the information they
generate and the potential use (or otherwise) of that in-
formation [10]. Nowadays, decision making [11] processes
are becoming increasingly very complex for managers [10],
therefore, the information needs of a manager are equally
becoming more complex and highly demanding.
1.2. Employers’ Perspective
On the employers’ part, a once prosperous business
might have run into an economic turbulence as a result of
diverse and adverse uncertainties that surround the busi-
ness environment. Several of these cases were witnessed
during the recent global economic recession which affected
several businesses globally and during which many busi-
nesses went underground (closed).
Therefore, when the revenue of a business goes down,
it may be economically impossible for management to sus-
tain the earlier agreements signed when the revenues of
the companies were booming. The same situation may oc-
cur if the rate of inflation adversely and grossly affects the
cost of production (CP ) in a firm without a corresponding
increase in revenue.
1.2.1. Wage Negotiation in Developing nations.
In developing nations [12] such as Nigeria, wage nego-
tiation has always been a chronic problem [13, 14] and this
menace has been directly and indirectly running down the
nation’s economy for many decades. This is because many
trade unions have always insisted on international wage
scales for their respective professions but irrespective of
whether the revenues of the countries attain the standards
on which those scales were designed.
For example, Medical Doctors, under the umbrella of
the Nigeria Medical Association (NMA) [15, 16] will al-
ways insist on World Health Organisation (WHO) salary
scales standard for their profession, not minding whether
the revenues and resources of the nation match those ex-
pected by these standards.
Also the academic staff in the universities, under their
union, Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) [14,
15, 16], have always insisted on the international pen-
sion scale called universities superannuation scheme (USS)
which may certainly be obtainable in developed nations
like the United State of America (USA) and the United
Kingdom (UK). However, the unions would never consider
the fact that their country’s revenues are very far below
those of the developed nations mentioned.
1.3. Employees’ Perspectives
Generally in any country and on the side of the employ-
ees however, the rates of inflation in the country mighty
have shot up astronomically such that earlier wage increase
agreements becomes unrealistic. This is because inflation
affects the purchasing powers of the consumers. Example
of this high inflation otherwise known as hyperinflation is
what is being currently experienced in Zimbabwe, a South-
ern African country.
1.4. Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy Sets
Fuzzy logic is a problem solving technique that was
introduced by Lotfi Zadeh in [17] to deal with vague or
imprecise problems [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27].
A fuzzy set is a set containing elements that have varying
degree of memberships in the set [18, 28]. It can simply
be defined as a set with fuzzy boundary [29]. Fuzzy sets
are denoted by different symbols in different literatures,
however, in this paper; a fuzzy set will be represented by
a letter with a tilde on top of it. That is, fuzzy set A
will be represented by A˜ and membership of a set will be
represented by µ. Therefore the functional mapping given
by:
µA˜(x) ∈ [0, 1]
denotes the degree of membership of element x in fuzzy set
A˜. Therefore, µA˜(x) is a value on the unit interval that
measures the degree to which element x belongs to fuzzy
set A˜.
1.5. Fuzzy Decision Making System
In general, a fuzzy decision making system (FDMS)
uses a collection of fuzzy membership functions (Figure 5)
and decision rules that are solicited from experts in the
field to reason about data [18]. Typical components of a
fuzzy decision making system are as shown in Figure 1.
The components of an FDMS, as shown in the figure are;
a fuzzification section, a fuzzy rule base, fuzzy decision
logic and defuzzification section [30, 31].
1. Fuzzification section: This is the section where the
process of making a crisp quantity fuzzy [32] is car-
ried out. This is done by simply recognising that
many of the quantities that we considered to be crisp
and deterministic are actually not deterministic at
all. They carry considerable uncertainty. If the form
of uncertainty happens to arise because of impreci-
sion, ambiguity, or vagueness, then the variable is
probably fuzzy and can be represented by a mem-
bership function.
2. Fuzzy rule base: These rules are expressed in con-
ventional antecedent-consequent form. The collec-
tion of such rules constitutes the fuzzy logic knowl-
edge base that is used for inference of the decision
agent. In a fuzzy system, if the antecedent is true
to some degree, then the consequent is also true to
that same degree. For a small number of inputs,
there exists a compact form of representing a fuzzy
rule-based system which consists of a tabular for-
mat with different partitions representing different
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inputs. This compact graphical form is called fuzzy
associative memory table, or FAM table. The im-
plication is implemented for each rule and in Mat-
lab, many built-in methods are supported such as
the functions that are used by the AND method:
min(minimum), which truncates the output fuzzy
set, prod (product), which scales the output fuzzy
set. Here, the AND method was used and the cen-
troid was computed using the Mamdani-type infer-
ence system which requires the output membership
functions to be fuzzy sets after the aggregation pro-
cess. It (Mamdani FIS) integrates, according to equa-
tion 1, across a two-dimensional function to find the
centroid [33].
3. The decision making logic (DML): The decision mak-
ing logic is analogous to classical logic for reasoning
[32] and it is similar to simulating human decision
making in inferring fuzzy control actions based on
the rules of inference in fuzzy logic [18].
4. Defuzzification process: This is the procedure that
converts the fuzzy results into a crisp output. It con-
verts a fuzzy control action (a fuzzy output) into a
non-fuzzy control action (a crisp output) [18]. De-
fuzzification has the result of reducing a fuzzy set to
a crisp single-valued input, or to a crisp set; of con-
verting a fuzzy matrix to a crisp matrix; or making
a fuzzy number a crisp number. Fuzziness helps to
evaluate the rules, but the final output of a fuzzy sys-
tem has to be a crisp number and the input for the
defuzzification process is the aggregate output fuzzy
set and the output is a single number [29]. Math-
ematically, the defuzzification of a fuzzy set is the
process of ‘rounding off’ from its location in the unit
hypercube to the nearest (in a geometric sense) ver-
tex. If one thinks of a fuzzy set as a collection of
membership values, or a vector of values on the unit
interval, defuzzification reduces this vector to a sin-
gle scalar quantity - presumably to the most typical
(prototype) or representative value [32].
Several defuzzification methods have been discussed
in the literatures such as [18, 29, 32]. In this paper,
we are using centroid method and we shall give a
brief explanation on it.
Centroid defuzzification method: This method is also
referred to as centre of area (COA) or centre of grav-
ity (COG). It is the most commonly used [18], most
popular [29], most physically appealing [32] defuzzi-
fication technique and it finds the point where a ver-
tical line would slice the aggregate set into two equal
masses. In theory, the centroid method of defuzzifi-
cation is calculated over a continuum of points in the
aggregate output membership function but in prac-
tice, a reasonable estimate can be obtained by cal-
culating it over a sample of points. Mathematically,
the centroid method can be expressed as:
COG =
∫
µA˜(x) ∗ x dx∫
µA˜(x) dx
(1)
COG =
∑
µA˜(x) ∗ x∑
µA˜(x)
(2)
Fuzzy inference techniques: In general, fuzzy deci-
sion making system can be implemented using any
of the three common methods of deductive inference
for fuzzy systems based on linguistic rules [32] listed
as follows: Mamdani system, Sugeno systems and
Tsukamoto models
In this work, the design and implementation of this
fuzzy decision making system was achieved with the aid
of Matlab software. Matlab is a menu driven software
that allows the implementation of fuzzy constructs like
membership functions and a database of decision rules [18].
2. Game Theory
Game theory is the study of the ways in which strate-
gic interactions among rational players produce outcomes
with respect to the preference (or utilities) of those play-
ers, none of which might have been intended by any of
them [34]. It is part of a large body of theories concerning
decision making [35]. It deals with decision-making pro-
cesses involving two or more parties, also known as players
with partly or completely conflicting interest [36, 37] and
it is one of the methodologies designed for application to
the social sciences. All situations in which at least one
agent can act to maximize his utility through anticipat-
ing (either consciously, or just implicitly by his behaviour)
the responses to his actions by one or more other agents,
are called games. Agents involved in games are referred
to as players [38, 34, 30, 39] and could represent people,
military, firms, countries or other organisations [40, 36].
For any game, there are three very important require-
ments and these are listed as follows [41]:
1. Players
2. Strategies which are permitted with respect to the
rules of the game and
3. Payoffs (that is, utilities or outcomes)
Further readings on game theory can be found in [36,
34, 42, 38, 34].
3. Proposed Fuzzy Model for Wage Negotiation
(FGAW)
Implementing our fuzzy reasoning (FGAW) model ap-
proach to wage negotiation will alleviate some of the con-
cerns mentioned in Section 1 above. The model takes effec-
tive cognisance of the factors that affect wage negotiation
and effectively grasps and captures the uncertainty therein
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using fuzzy rules solicited from experts in the field. That
is, the model considers varying ranges of inflation trends
as they affect both parties and also considers the varying
ranges of possible revenue increase of the organisation. It
arrives at an agreed rate for wage increase which can be
more sustainable for both the present and the future. This
will also be more agreeable and acceptable to both parties.
For instance, rather than specifying 5% yearly increase,
we propose a scheme such as:
IF Inflation is very high AND Revenue is very low
THEN Wage increase is medium.
We verified this scheme and proved its validity with our
algorithm and we discovered that it could be an invaluable
tool in the hands of entrepreneurs. Details of the scheme
are as explained in the sections that follow.
4. Justification for the Scheme and Contributions
• The scheme will reduce the level of industrial dis-
putes and revenue or profit losses. This is because
both the employers and the employees already know
the factors on which their wage increases are based
and both parties can calculate the expected wage in-
crease for a particular year right from their own desk
based on the factors specified in the fuzzy rule base.
• Rather than management pushing or driving workers
to work hard, for the betterment or success of the
firm, this scheme would indirectly rest these duties
in the hands of the workers or their unions who will
encourage employees to work hard so as to increase
the revenues of the firm and hence, directly increase
their wages.
• The scheme will reduce man hours lost on yearly
wage negotiation.
• It puts fate of the workers regarding salary increase
in their own hands. The harder they work, the better
the firm’s revenue and the better the increase in their
wages.
• It will reduce unemployment rate. This is because
firms will no longer embark on sudden staff cut [1] as
a results of unregulated agitation for wage increase
which firms are occasionally forced to pay.
• There will be no need for staff to take abrupt pay
cuts [2, 1, 5] in bids to keep the company afloat as
was the case in Highland Airways [43], British Broad-
casting Corporation (BBC) [2] and many other com-
panies during the 2009 economic recession.
5. Factors in Wage Negotiation
In competitive labour markets, wage rates are deter-
mined by the forces of supply and demand for labour [44].
Even though, there may be many factors to be considered
during wage negotiation, there are two major inevitable
factors: inflation and revenue. These two concepts are as
explained below.
5.1. Inflation
Inflation in simple terms can be defined as a decline
in the purchasing power of money for goods and services.
It is a rise in the aggregate level of prices of goods and
services in a particular economy over a certain period of
time [44].
Inflation is one of the major factors that are usually
considered in wage bargaining [45, 46]. Den Butter and
van de Wijngaert in [46] defined wage space as the sum of
price inflation and labour productivity growth. In eco-
nomics, inflation is commonly calculated by using con-
sumer price index (CPI) [47]. Raffaela Giordano in [45]
stated that the relationship between labour cost and in-
flation is statistically significant and quantitatively non-
trivial.
5.2. Company’s Profit
On wage bargaining and company’s profit, many au-
thors have worked on the idea of profit (Net income) shar-
ing schemes to replace simple wage rates. One of such
is [48] in which Norman Ireland explained the argument
that profit sharing concerns microeconomic efficiency and
relates to incentives in the place of work. He further ex-
plained that if workers see how their labour turns into
profit from which they benefit, and particularly if they
have some say in determining their work practices, then
work will be better motivated, better performed and more
highly valued.
Reinhilde Veugelers in [49] reports a model that applies
a generalized Nash-Zeuthen-Harsanyi asymmetric bargain-
ing theory [50]. She explained that the bargaining outcome
from this scenario is that workers receive the competitive
wage plus a fraction of the firm’s price-cost margins.
6. Players’ Strategies in Wage Negotiation
A strategy is a decision rule that specifies how the
player will act in every possible circumstance [51]. It is
a specific course of action taken by the firm. This will
involve the firm allocating values to its policy variables
[44].
In this experiment, we assume that the business has
five units of initial resources (profit say £5M). Both the
employer (represented as fuzzy player y) and the employ-
ees (represented as opponent player g) are deliberating on
how this profit should be spent and also, how subsequent
(future) profits generated by the company should be spent.
Both players agreed on a three variable-vector [C,W,M ].
This forms the strategies for both players. That is, em-
ployer (y) strategy is [Cy,Wy,My] while that of the em-
ployee is [Cg,Wg,Mg]. The bone of contention is “what
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proportion of this £5M should be allocated to each of these
strategic variables C, W and M?.
In each round, the players may choose to allocate their
resources to one of these three roles: consolidation ef-
forts (C), reserved wealth (W ) and market expansion (M).
The allocations are denoted as a vector [C,W,M ] for each
player and constitute the strategy of that player.
Consolidation efforts C refer to the proportion of the
profit that adds to the wage increase of the employees and
it is the most important variable to the employees as they
would want to maximise this as much as they could. Mar-
ket expansion M denotes the part of this profit designated
for market expansion of the business including advertising,
marketing and promotional campaigns. These are con-
sidered as the most important variables to the employers
which they would like to maximise as much as they could.
Reserved wealth W refers to part of the resources that are
kept unused or those distributed to the firm’s shareholders.
As examples of players’ strategies, consider a case where
the employer Y decides to allocate £4M out of the £5M
on market expansion M = 4, and retaining £1M to be
distributed to shareholders as shares, W = 1. This means
that for that financial year, there would be no wage in-
crease for (or to consolidate the) workers, C = 0. Then,
employer strategy implies:
[Cy,Wy,My] = [0, 1, 4]
On the other hand, workers, represented by their union,
may embark on negotiation with their employer with a
proposal that £3M be allocated to wage increase (C = 3),
£1M to shareholders (W = 1) and the remains on market
or business expansion M = 1. Therefore, the workers’
strategy becomes:
[Cg,Wg,Mg] = [3, 1, 1]
The variables in our models can be tailored to the busi-
ness situations in the real world and therefore are not lim-
ited to those variables that we have used in designing the
system. Therefore, this model can be applied to any real
business situation and the variables can be adapted to suit
the situation in question. The model can also work for sys-
tems that have more strategic variables than those that we
have used in this model. The proposed decision model is
as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
7. Assumptions
In this simulation, while we are considering only infla-
tionary trends and business revenue as the most important
factors in determining wage increase, we are assuming that
other factors remain constant and that decision makers are
rational in their views. These other factors that are kept
constant include the labour force and the market trends.
We are also assuming that the labour force of the or-
ganisations are represented jointly by their unions and
that all necessary information about the company (such
Input
(crisp) 
Fuzzific- 
ation 
Process 
 
Fuzzy 
Decision
Defuzz-
ification 
process 
 
 Output 
(crisp) 
Fuzzy 
Rule  
Base 
Figure 1: Fuzzy decision making system (FDMS) for fuzzy inference.
This is used as part of the components of the FGAW model shown
in Figure 2.
as the company account details) are available to both the
union and the employer’s representatives in the decision
processes.
Further more, the fuzzy rules ought to be solicited from
experts in the field in order to implement the model more
accurately and effectively in a real system. In this paper,
due to time limitation and other factors, we have relied on
assumed fuzzy rules which are based on heuristic and from
our business knowledge.
8. Methodology and a Case Study of the Fuzzy
Game Approach to Wage Negotiation (FGAW)
We assume that the company has initial resources (say
£5M) profit. These resources are being deliberated upon
by the two parties namely:
1. Employer (represented as fuzzy player (yellow) y)
2. Employees (or their union as representative, repre-
sented as player (green) g)
These resources are to be allocated initially between
three variables [C,W,M ] that form the strategy of each
player. The subsequent allocation will follow the outcome
of the fuzzy rules from the fuzzy inference system formu-
lated by each party and the expected outcome will deter-
mine the winner.
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Figure 2: A model of fuzzy game approach to wage negotiation
(FGAW) game showing inputs, processes and outputs. The FDMS
components are as shown in Figure 1
.
The procedures necessary for implementing the pro-
posed FGAW automatic decision system are as listed in
the steps below:
1. List all uncertain (fuzzy) factors that will be consid-
ered in taking the business decision: the uncertain
or fuzzy information we are taking into consideration
are changes in business profit R and in the inflation
I.
2. Determining the strategy: the game strategies are as
explained in Section 6. The business has five units
of initial resources (profit say £5M). Both the em-
ployer (represented as fuzzy player y) and the em-
ployees (represented as opponent player g) are de-
liberating on how this profit should be spent and
also, how subsequent profits generated by the com-
pany should hence be spent. Both players agreed
on three variable-vector [C,W,M ]. This forms the
strategies for both players. That is, employer (y)
strategy is [Cy,Wy,My] while that of the employ-
ees is [Cg,Wg,Mg]. The bone of contention is “what
proportion of this £5M should be allocated to each
of these strategic variables C, W and M?. Further
details on player strategies are as explained in Sec-
tion 6.
3. Determine the input and output variables of FGAW
FIS: The inputs are the values of change in infla-
tion (∆I), and change in business profit (∆R) and
the outputs are expected wage increase (consolida-
tion efforts) (Ec), expected wealth (Ew) and ex-
pected market expansion efforts (Em) where: Em =
5− (Ew +Ec) because the total (expected) resource
of each player at any point is five. The variables Ec,
Ew, and Em relate to the fuzzy player y, and we will
not index them by y.
4. Develop fuzzy sets, subsets and membership func-
tions for all the input and output variables. This can
be accomplished by soliciting knowledge from the
experts or searching through literature data. Our
adopted fuzzy sets, subsets and membership func-
tions are as shown in Figure 5.
5. Formulate decision rules for the rule base. These also
ought to be solicited from experts [24]. The rules
shown in figure 5 also depict our adopted decision
rules.
6. Establish relationships between input values and their
fuzzy sets and apply the decision rules using the re-
lationships shown in Figure 5. The fuzzy rule base
was coded into a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) using
the Matlab toolbox.
7. Play the game: Procedures for playing the game are
as follows: The game state is represented as vec-
tor S = [g, y, Aw, r], where g represents the green
player’s amount of resources, y represents the fuzzy
player (yellow) amount of resources, Aw represents
opponents’ accumulated wealth (profit) and r is the
number of rounds that the game is played. Both the
green and fuzzy player strategy are as stated in step
2 above.
• Initial state of the game is [5, 5, 0, 5] (i.e accord-
ing to vector [g, y, Aw, r]).
• At every state [g, y, Aw, r], green chooses his
move by allocating to his strategies [Cg,Wg,Mg]
where: Cg + Wg + Mg = g = 5 and yellow
who is the fuzzy player chooses his strategy
[Cy,Wy,My] where Cy +Wy +My = y = 5.
• The game changes states as follows:
r = r − 1, (3)
Aw = Aw +Wg −Wy, (4)
g = g + Cg +Mgr − (y + Cy +Myr), (5)
y = y + Cy +Myr − (g + Cg +Mgr), (6)
temp = Aw + g − y (7)
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where temp represents game payoff. Then,
Em = 5− (Ew + Ec) (8)
This is because the total or expected resources
of each player at any point amount to five. Now,
the outputs of each round of the game are ex-
pected wage increase (consolidation efforts) (Ec),
expected wealth (Ew) and expected market ex-
pansion efforts (Em). This then forms the input
strategies for the fuzzy player in the subsequent
rounds of the game.
In order to calculate inflation (input for FIS) for
a particular year, we simply calculate the per-
centage change of consumer price index (CPI)
as follows:
Inflation(I) =
CPI1 − CPI0
CPI0
∗
100
1
(9)
where CPI0 is the initial value and CPI1 is the
final value.
However, an entrepreneur may want to base his
own inflation on the changes in the cost of pro-
duction (CP ) of his goods or services such that
inflation is calculated as:
Inflation(I) =
CP1 − CP0
CP0
∗
100
1
(10)
Where CP0 is the initial value and CP1 is the
final value.
and change in profit (∆R) of the business is
calculated as
∆R =
R1 −R0
R0
∗
100
1
(11)
where R0 is the initial profit value and R1 is
the final value.
The game ends when r = 0 and if temp is
greater than zero (temp > 0), the green player
(the employees) wins, if less than zero (temp <
0), then the fuzzy player (yellow or employer)
wins else, the game is a draw (i.e. if temp = 0).
Sample rules of the fuzzy inference system are as
copied below:
Rule Base 1:
(a) If (Net Profit is High) and (Inflation is Medium)
then (Expected Wage Increase is Medium)
(b) If (Net Profit is Medium) and (Inflation is Low)
then (Expected Wage Increase is Small)
(c) If (Net Profit is Medium) and (Inflation is Medium)
then (Expected Wage Increase is Medium)
(d) If (Net Profit is Medium) and (Inflation is High)
then (Expected Wage Increase is Large)
(e) If (Net Profit is Low) and (Inflation is Low)
then (Expected Wage Increase is Medium)
Rule Base 2
(a) If (Net Profit is High) and (Inflation is Medium)
then (Expected Market Expansion is High)
(b) If (Net Profit is Medium) and (Inflation is Medium)
then (Expected Market Expansion is Medium)
(c) If (Net Profit is Medium) and (Inflation is High)
then (Expected Market Expansion is Low)
(d) If (Net Profit is Low) and (Inflation is Medium)
then (Expected Market Expansion is Very High)
These rules are as coded in Figure 4.
8. Evaluate the fuzzy inference system (FIS): Using Mat-
lab fuzzy toolbox, all the fuzzy inputs are passed into
the Mamdani type FIS.
9. Get the defuzzified output from the FIS: The crisp
output for the FGAW is computed using centre of
gravity method (COG) method. Figure 5 shows the
FIS interface for the output variable Expected Wage
Increase or consolidation (Ec) and a defuzzified (crisp)
output interface is as shown in Figure 6.
10. Determine whether the conditions for the end of the
game have been met: In this case study, the condi-
tion for the end of the game is when the number of
rounds r reaches 1 counting down from 5 (i.e. when
r = 1).
11. Training and performance evaluation: Training and
learning of the FGAW decision agent was accom-
plished through the optimization of the fuzzy logic
parameters while using the game payoff as the basis
for the performance measure after playing a series of
the game as in [40]. This training or learning of the
fuzzy agent to optimize its performance was achieved
through the use of the fminsearch function in Mat-
lab having considered other optimization algorithms
such as gradient descent and genetic algorithm.
Fminsearch uses the Nelder-Mead Simplex Search
Method for finding the local minimum x of an uncon-
strained multivariable function f(x) using derivative-
free method and starting at an initial estimate. This
is generally referred to as unconstrained non-linear
optimization. If n is the length of x, a simplex in
n-dimensional space is characterized by the n + 1
distinct vectors that are its vertices. In two-space, a
simplex is a triangle; in three-space, it is a pyramid.
At each step of the search, a new point in or near the
current simplex is generated. The function value at
the new point is compared with the function’s values
at the vertices of the simplex and, usually, one of the
vertices is replaced by the new point, giving a new
simplex. This step is repeated until the diameter of
the simplex is less than the specified tolerance [52].
We maximized the fuzzy agent’s payoff based on the
fuzzy membership functions (MFs) and therefore, al-
gorithm stops when opponent’s wealth is minimized.
However, during the optimization, the membership
functions need to retain a valid shape.
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All these steps that are necessary for playing this game
are as summarized in the flowchart shown in Figure 3.
Start  
Do steps 1, 2 & 3 
                                                      Yes 
                                                                                                   No 
                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                        No 
                           
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                           Yes 
Step 4:  
Develop membership functions 
Step 7: 
Play the game 
Step 10: 
r > 1
Step 11: 
Do learning (training) 
Set criteria
met ?
Do steps 5 & 6 
Do steps 8 & 9 
Compute results & get winner 
Stop  
Figure 3: Chart showing the two loops of the wage game. The first
loop stops when r = 1 (this means the fifth round of the game) and
the second loop represents learning of the fuzzy player and it stops
when the set performance criteria have been met as explained in
step 11 .
9. Results Discussion for Fuzzy Game Approach
to Wage Negotiation
Based on the procedures highlighted in Section 8 above
and from the results in Table 1, the results of the game
show that yellow (employer) wins more often than green
(employees’ union) because the business wage decision was
based on the output of fuzzy reasoning from the fuzzy
inference system (FIS) and learning was used. This shows
the extent to which fuzzy reasoning can help a business
if it wants to make use of fuzzy rules plus learning for
their decision support tools. Fuzzy rules make the wage
negotiation more flexible and were able to capture both the
present and the future uncertainty inherent in the business
environment.
These results on Table 1 (columns six and seven) show
that the fuzzy player (Yellow which represents the em-
ployer) in FGAW iterations was able to win more often
 
Figure 4: The rule base for the inflation rate and business profit
coded using Matlab software.
 
Figure 5: FIS interface for the membership functions of the output
variable Expected Wage Increase or consolidation (Ec).
than the employees’ union (Green) because the manage-
ment of the business made use of the fuzzy inference sys-
tem in making the business decisions. Out of the thirteen
FGAW iterations on the table, yellow won a total of ten
iterations.
The results of the control experiments in columns four
and five of the table (in which business did not use fuzzy
rules to make decisions) show that green wins as often as
yellow does. These two results (the FGAW games and the
control experiment simulations) are as summarized in the
pie chart of Figure 7. The results of the control experi-
ment (where fuzzy rules were not used) may be considered
dangerous for the business. This is because if employees
continue to win and wages continue to grow without corre-
sponding market expansion, the trend may lead to gradual
demise of the business.
We also observed, as shown in the table, that the stronger
the strategy, the higher the payoff. This means that the
more the yellow player allocates to market expansion, the
better the payoffs. That is, for the business to continue
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 Figure 6: Defuzzified (crisp) values for Expected Wage Increase or
Consolidation (Ec) at inputs I = R = 2.5.
Results of AGAW Games
Yellow (Employer) 
Wins
77%
Green (Union) Wins
23%
Yellow (Employer) Wins
Green (Union) Wins
Figure 7: This chart summarises the performances of the fuzzy player
(employer) and the union in the FGAW simulations shown on Ta-
ble 1.
to survive, decision makers may need to allocate more re-
sources to marketing.
After training, the fuzzy player performs better with
higher payoffs. This shows that the learning is important
as the fuzzy player is able to adapt with fuzzy reasoning
over time.
10. Conclusion
We have used a fuzzy inference system in designing an
effective and efficient decision system that models wage
bargaining processes in organisations. The model took ef-
fective cognisance of the aims of the two parties involved
and effectively captures the uncertainty therein using fuzzy
rules solicited from experts in the field. The model con-
siders varying ranges of inflation trends as it affects both
parties and also considers the varying ranges of possible
revenue increase of the organisation. It arrives at an agreed
rate for wage increase which may be sustainable for both
present and in the future. This may also be more agreeable
and acceptable to both parties.
The result of the model showed that the employer wins
most often because the management implemented fuzzy
rule base and used learning in taking their wage decisions.
.
Table 1: Results of the FGAW game decision system
Player Moves Control Expmt FGAW Players
S/N Green Yellow Winner Payoff Winner Payoff
1 1, 1, 3 1, 0, 4 Yellow -22.0 Yellow -63.9
2 2, 1, 2 1, 1, 3 Yellow -52.7 Yellow -94.8
3 3, 0, 2 2, 0, 3 Yellow -26.7 Yellow -68.8
4 4, 0, 1 4, 0, 1 Green 40.8 Yellow -8.2
5 1, 0, 4 2, 0, 3 Green 351.6 Green 302.2
6 3, 1, 1 4, 0, 1 Yellow -16.1 Yellow -65.2
7 3, 0, 2 2, 1, 2 Green 136.8 Green 94.9
8 3, 1, 1 3, 1, 1 Green 14.8 Yellow -34.2
9 3, 1, 1 2, 0, 3 Yellow -289.3 Yellow -305.0
10 0, 5, 0 1, 4, 0 Yellow -99.8 Yellow -142.2
11 0, 5, 0 0, 1, 4 Yellow -704.8 Yellow -747.2
12 0, 0, 5 0, 5, 0 Green 1054.5 Green 1012.0
13 0, 5, 0 0, 0, 5 Yellow -863.8 Yellow -906.2
l1 From the table, the first column shows the serial numbers of
the iterations, the second column contains player green’s strate-
gies while the third column contains that of yellow. For exam-
ple, in the first iteration, green’s strategy shows [1, 1, 3], this in-
dicates how resources are allocated to green strategy [C,W,M ]:
C = 1, W = 1 and M = 3. The fourth and fifth columns contain
the control experiments in which the business management did
not use fuzzy rules in the wage negotiation. The sixth and sev-
enth columns show FGAW players and the results, that is, the
simulations in which the business uses fuzzy rules in taking its
decisions. Detailed results are discussed in Section 9 and are as
further summarized in the pie chart of Figure 7.
This helped to formulate sustainable wage agreements be-
tween employers and employees.
However, the fact that the employer wins most often
may not necessarily mean that the employees are cheated
but rather guarantees the continue survival of their firm
(or organisation) and therefore guarantees the continuity
of their jobs. If our scheme could be employed by en-
trepreneurs, it would help to greatly reduce deadlocks that
usually plague wage negotiations between employers and
employees (or their union) and will therefore increase pro-
ductivities.
11. Future Research
We will apply this model in a wider range of micro and
macroeconomic models that are targeted to specific indus-
tries and international trades among countries. We will do
experiments to determine the actual duration and num-
ber of steps in the business games. We plan to apply the
model to other different strategic games and to replace the
adaptation of the membership functions by operations on
type-2 fuzzy sets [53]. Also, the model can be applied for
optimizing bidding in auctions and in a variety of human
resource allocation decisions. It could also be applied for
pension negotiations in determining what percentages the
employers and employees should contribute toward their
pension pots.
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